10. State
10.3 Topic Areas
I will now go through all the futurities presented in this book, in order. For each one, I’ll examine whether it would be better implemented at the level of the central state or at the level of the communities.
Additionally, I want to jot down some thoughts on how certain other policy areas could function within this state.
Unconditional Basic Income (Chapter 5.1)
For this concept, implementation could occur at either the community level or at the central state level—or a combination of both, which is probably the best solution:
There would be a law that determines the funding and distribution of the UBI at a level agreed upon by at least 60% of the voting weight of the communities.
A community that wants a higher UBI for its members would pay the difference itself, which it would have to finance from its own revenues. It would therefore have admission criteria, to keep it from having a membership which collectively causes more expenses than income.
No Patent System (Chapter 5.2)
This would simply be implemented by not having a patent law at the central state level. Although communities could still establish rules for patents at their own level, these would have no effect on members of other communities. Thus, I see no advantage for a community to do so.
Culturepoints (Chapter 5.3)
This concept must be implemented at the central state level. Only then will the incentives for media creators be strong enough to produce better news through culturepoints than in an advertising-funded media landscape.
Culturepoints are a second currency. This means they will only function well if they can be used everywhere in the country.
The constitution prohibits communities from restricting access to information (Article 1.3).
Healthcare (Chapter 6)
This should be implemented at the community level.
In this concept, hospitals and polyclinics are located in cities, meaning only central state laws apply there. However, as long as central laws do not state otherwise, these institutions can still decide whom to treat and whom not to, and what house rules apply.
Communities will need to ensure through admission criteria that not all the sick and elderly gather in the community with the best healthcare.
In my healthcare concept, the state still had to make lots of decisions, even though I tried to leave as many as possible to the autonomy of the doctors: how the healthcare app is structured, how the competence of doctors is determined, how much they are paid, how effort points per diagnosis and per treatment are set, which treatments and medications are covered by health insurance, how predictions via computer simulations work, and much more.
Yes, digitization helps the state make all these decisions, and clear rules help even more. Nevertheless, there will be many points where opinions may differ on how best to implement the system.
And aside from all these parameters of my futurity, there is, of course, nothing stopping communities from trying a completely different concept. Healthcare is a prime example of a societal system where communities can experiment and compete for the best solution.
Alternatively, I can imagine healthcare systems running in parallel to communities, with multiple communities operating a shared healthcare system to achieve efficiency gains. Or, conversely, a community could offer its members a choice between multiple healthcare systems.
The same considerations apply to care, which I excluded in Chapter 6 to focus on one problem area. Here, too, communities can compete for the best solution, or care systems could run in parallel to communities.
How good the healthcare system is, how much data it collects, how much it restricts the freedom of its members (for example, through mandatory preventive checkups)—all of these can be important distinguishing factors that citizens use to decide which community they want to belong to.
Education System (Chapter 7)
The constitution assigns the central state the responsibility for the education system as a mandatory task (Article 8.1). In this state kindergartens and schools will, just like the cities, become a melting pot for the entire society. The state organizes them, and children from all communities attend them together. It is important that schools are always located in cities so that the children of each school do actually come from many different communities.96
Through their diversity, schools keep society from drifting apart too much, and offer all citizens the realistic option of changing communities.
Mandatory state-organized schools are also necessary to provide all children with as equal opportunities in life as possible—which I consider an important state objective. It is one of the reasons why schools take on such extensive responsibility for their students in my educational concept, providing them with everything necessary.
However, just because the state organizes the schools does not mean that the communities cannot influence them. This depends on how that central law is designed. The school includes choices for children and many optional modules. Allowing communities to offer children more such options makes the school significantly more adaptable before the official curriculum needs to be adjusted.
Proof of any kind of acquired knowledge can be provided by publishing it as officially confirmed information in one's own citizen account. Schools and adult education centers will offer these confirmations for all their modules, just as they issue pins as analog proofs.
The state should also provide and fund vocational training programs that build on school education (as described in Chapter 7). Unlike mandatory education, there is no reason why communities or companies cannot offer alternatives here.
Research should be funded by the central state but not solely directed by it. Therefore, communities receive research funds proportional to how many full-citizens they have. They may only use this money for research, but without the central state dictating what is getting researched with it. This creates a more heterogeneous research landscape and avoids blind spots, since, in addition to the central state, every community can prioritize and promote the research it deems important.
Software (Chapter 8.1)
Software with societal benefits can be promoted by the central state or by communities.
Like with research, it is also an advantage here if various communities promote the software they consider important, rather than just the central state—it increases the likelihood that worthy ideas and software receive funding.
Public Transportation (Chapter 8.2)
The constitution assigns the central state the mandatory task of public transportation (Article 8.6); it is managed and funded by the state. The same applies to the road and rail networks and the traffic tunnels in the cities. In all leased land outside the cities, the transportation network is the responsibility of the leaseholders. Rail and overland roads are established beforehand, their land remains unleased (Type I).
Central state buses will travel on roads in villages and industrial areas, and their passage must not be denied (Article 5.5). Banishments for passengers do not apply during transit.
Because of these special rights on community land, it is essential for the functioning of this kinotarchy that the central state takes on this task. Private competition (which does not work for banished citizens) is possible with state support.
PD System (Chapter 8.3)
This power and data network can be developed privately. The central state will likely mandate its use in cities. What communities do on their own land is up to them (with the risk of being disconnected from the power grid if they cannot immediately reduce their consumption when necessary).
Water, Electricity, Internet, Capsulenet (Chapter 8.4)
The central state maintains the state infrastructure. There is no reason not to build it exactly as described in Chapter 8.4.
Leased land is connected to it depending on its type (see Chapter 9.5). Communities can decide for themselves how to handle infrastructure on communal land.
Container Homes and Houses (Chapters 9.1, 9.2)
Container homes are a norm, not a requirement. Once established, market incentives will sustain them. There will be no laws dictating that homes and houses must look a certain way. On the contrary: more choices for citizens are better. Of course communities can set rules regarding container homes, if they wish.
Land Ownership and Cities (Chapters 9.5, 9.3)
Something like the leasing rules described in “9.5 Land Ownership” is necessary for this concept to work. The land is owned by the central state. The leasing is also handled by the central state. Lessees will often be communities, either directly or through their members.
The lease must be high enough that it can only be afforded or justified if sufficient profit is made from the land (varying by land type and region) or if other benefits are derived from it. Only in this way will land shift quickly enough from unsuccessful communities to successful ones, ensuring that communities have land available according to their success, where their rules apply.
The leasing rules also give rise to the city structure described in “9.3 Cities”. Since cities can never be communal land (Article 5.5), cities are always entirely under central state administration. The individual high-rise buildings are constructed by leaseholders, while the infrastructure between the high-rises is provided by the central state. Throughout the entire city area (including the forested areas between high-rise clusters), only the laws of the central state apply.
Taxes
See also Chapter 9.5, section “Conclusion”.
The first of the additional policy areas I want to address is the question of taxes. These are merely my thoughts on the matter—none of this is enshrined in the constitution or required for the kinotarchy to function.
• A major source of revenue for the central state will be lease income from land and fees for the extraction of resources.
• So long as they do not have employees, the central state should only levy taxes or fees from citizens where it provides them with a specific service. An example of this would be public transportation.
• Since businesses cannot belong to any community (as they are not citizens but legal entities), they will only pay taxes to the central state. This also keeps communities from competing for companies by offering the lowest possible taxes.
• The state income from leases and corporate taxes should be high enough to fund a universal basic income (UBI). Financing the UBI in this way will work significantly better than through an income tax, as assumed in Chapter 5.1 for simplicity.
• All other taxes and fees should be paid by citizens to their community, not to the central state. This allows citizens to weigh whether the services offered are worth the cost or if they want to switch communities.
Immigration
For the topic of immigration, the same thoughts apply: Nothing of this is predetermined by the constitution. This is merely my proposal on how the two levels—the central state and the communities—could collaborate for a better migration policy.
Immigration consists of two fundamental components: that which is beneficial to society and that which is morally motivated.
To the greatest extent possible, the part that is beneficial to society should be regulated by the central state. For the sake of fairness and higher efficiency, and since 60% of the voting weight should be able to agree on it. This covers the influx of skilled workers, or individuals who are beneficial to society for other reasons (for example, to counteract an aging population).
Immigration permitted for moral reasons or out of compassion should, on the other hand, be decided by the communities. Here, it would be absurd to require 60% of the voting power to agree. Instead, the central state should only set an overall budget for such immigration, which is then distributed among the communities.
I envision the implementation of this basic principle as follows:
• The central state provides a website where immigration applications can be submitted, and data can be provided (country of origin, language skills, education, assets, age, religion, gender, etc.). The person does not need to attach any evidence here (but it will be listed what counts). All information is voluntary. Multiple people can submit interlinked applications because they want to immigrate together.
• Based on the provided information and the algorithm defined by the immigration law, the website calculates a point value, indicating how beneficial this person or group would be to the state. If this point value is high enough, the website informs that immigration will be approved if the information is accurate and proven.
• If the point value is not high enough, the application is forwarded to the algorithms of the individual communities. Each community can use its algorithm, which it can change at any time, to determine which immigrants it wants to support with its immigration budget allocated by the central state. The data does not leave the central computer evaluating the applications. Thus, communities have no way to make their decision based on anything other than the provided data, and no way to delay it. This should make bribery impossible.
Communities have the option to increase their immigration budget from their own resources or to support immigrants with their own integration services (thereby reducing the immigration budget required). In this way, each community can decide to support asylum seekers more strongly than the consensus of the central state.
• If the sum of support from the central state (based on the point value) and the communities is sufficient, the website informs the applicant that immigration will be approved if the information is accurate and proven.
• The website returns an application number, which the applicant should keep safe. It can be provided at the border. If the applicant can provide all the required evidence for their information, then immigration is approved, and the person becomes a citizen. This process gives immigrants planning security, as the calculation no longer changes.
• Both the central state’s point value and the communities’ algorithms take into account how much of their immigration budget they have already used. Thus, the number of immigrants will always be limited to a level that society can afford and integrate. Who is given priority is determined by the central state’s needs algorithm and the communities’ selection criteria. There is no sharp distinction between skilled workers and refugees.
• Communities can contact accepted applicants to assist them in reaching the country. They must finance this from their own resources and bear the risk of whether the applicant’s information was correct. They can request evidence in advance and assist in obtaining it.
• Of course, the application can also be submitted at the border. This does not change the algorithms. But it is far more sensible for everyone to enter the data beforehand and provide the application number at the border instead. This way, one knows in advance whether their application is good enough, and can hope for support in reaching the border.
The entire issue of where asylum procedures take place and how long they last is resolved with this approach. Since only the documents that the person carries with them are considered, the immigration check takes at most a few days.
Naturally, such a check will not reliably uncover spies or attackers. It couldn’t do so even if it took longer, as the necessary resources would be far too high. Anyway, spies and attackers can simply enter the country as tourists or be recruited over the internet. Protection against this must happen elsewhere—for example, through urban design (9.3), background checks for certain jobs, or when purchasing weapons.
What this check can do is to determine whether someone has a problematic worldview, mental health issues, or other characteristics endangering peaceful coexistence. And based on this, deny immigration or allocate more resources for integration and psychological treatment—depending on how much risk society is willing to take and how much money the central state or communities are willing to spend on this person.
Every guest worker and every refugee who lives permanently (more than a few months) in a country should obtain citizenship. Anything else leads to inhumane processes where well-integrated individuals are deported. And for every person who stays in the country longer than a few months, the effort of good integration should be made to prevent the emergence of parallel societies. The fact that only full-citizens (having acquired all mandatory education, Article 4.3) contribute to the voting weight of communities (Article 4.4) serves as a protective mechanism for society. It ensures that immigrants only gain a political voice after successful integration.
This system does not guarantee that every person in need of protection can immigrate. Instead, it is up to the communities to enable more refugees to immigrate, and to support people in their flight. It is precisely this limitation which prevents society from breaking under the task of integration and ensures that public support does not turn into fear of loss and xenophobia.